RDA exam practice questions: Laws and regulations

Answer A: Stop and tell the dentist before treatment begins, because the disclosure is the dentist's duty.

Cobbs v. Grant places on the provider a duty of reasonable disclosure of the available choices and the dangers involved in each, measured by what a reasonable patient needs to decide — and that conversation belongs to the treating dentist because diagnosis and treatment planning are never delegable.

Common trap: the helpful-sounding option has the RDA narrating risks and alternatives, which is stepping into diagnosis; a signature collected before the required disclosure is not informed consent, and a financial estimate discloses price, not dangers and choices.

Source: Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229 — California's informed consent doctrine: a duty of reasonable disclosure of the available choices with respect to…

Answer A: Do not confirm or deny anything, because the CMIA makes confidentiality the default.

California's CMIA makes confidentiality the default and bars disclosure without an authorization outside the statute's own exceptions, and HIPAA's treatment, payment, and health care operations permissions do not cover an employer verifying an absence. When the layers differ, the stricter rule controls.

Common trap: identifying information supplied by the caller authenticates nothing, and "confirm only the appointment" still discloses that the person is a patient and was treated.

Source: California Civil Code §56.10 (Confidentiality of Medical Information Act) — permitted and prohibited disclosures of patient medical information; the…

Answer C: Stop and tell the dentist before treatment begins, because disclosing diagnosis, risks, and alternatives is the dentist's non-delegable duty.

Cobbs v. Grant imposes on the provider "a duty of reasonable disclosure of the available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of the dangers inherently and potentially involved in each," measured by what a reasonable patient would need in order to decide. That disclosure conversation belongs to the treating dentist, because diagnosis and treatment planning are never delegable to any dental assistant. The RDA's lawful moves are procedural: confirm consent is documented before assisting, and route the patient's confusion or hesitation to the dentist.

Common trap: Option A is the helpful-sounding answer and the most commonly chosen wrong one — an RDA who narrates risks and alternatives has stepped into diagnosis and treatment planning. Option B inverts the sequence: a signature collected before the required disclosure is not informed consent, and consent explained for one procedure but obtained for another is no consent at all. Option D confuses a financial estimate with informed consent; a cost form discloses price, not dangers and choices.

Source: Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229 — California's informed consent doctrine: the provider's duty to disclose information a reasonable patient needs…

Answer B: Disclose nothing and route the request to the dentist; without authorization or a statutory exception, the CMIA bars disclosure.

Civil Code §56.10 commands that a provider of health care "shall not disclose medical information regarding a patient … without first obtaining an authorization," outside the exceptions the statute itself lists. HIPAA's permission to share for treatment, payment, and health care operations does not reach an employer's curiosity, and where the minimum-necessary standard applies, permitted sharing is bounded. Because HIPAA is a federal floor, the stricter California rule controls when the two overlap.

Common trap: Options A and C dress an ordinary nosy call in real statutory vocabulary — "operations" and "payment" are genuine HIPAA categories, which makes them feel authorized. This is the classic "HIPAA allows it, so it's legal" error: even where a federal permission arguably exists, the CMIA's default of no disclosure without authorization governs. Option D confuses identifying the caller with being authorized by the patient; knowing a birthdate is not an authorization, and the fact of an appointment is itself protected information.

Source: California Civil Code §56.10 (Confidentiality of Medical Information Act) — permitted and prohibited disclosures of patient medical information

Answer B: Make her own telephone report immediately or as soon as practicably possible to police or the county welfare department, with a written report within 36 hours.

The RDA is covered through Penal Code §11165.7(a)(21)'s catchall for persons "currently licensed under Division 2" of the BPC — the subdivision names a dentist and a dental hygienist but not a "dental assistant," so an RDA is covered by her license and an unlicensed DA is not covered by job title. Her initial agreement that the dentist would "take care of it" can lawfully operate as a §11166(h) team designation, but once she learns the designee failed, §11166(h) requires her to make the report. The telephone report — to a police or sheriff's department or the county welfare department — is immediate or as soon as is practicably possible, followed by the written report within 36 hours. Reasonable suspicion is the trigger; proof is not required, good-faith reports are protected, and failing to report when required is itself a crime.

Common trap: Option A is the strongest distractor because it matches every other workplace instinct — chain of command. A §11166(h) mutual-agreement designation is the only lawful way to route a report through a colleague, and §11166(i) confirms that merely notifying a supervisor is not a report and that no supervisor may impede reporting; either way the duty revives here because the designee did not report. Option C imports a proof standard the statute does not use. Option D combines two myths: that employer permission is needed, and a 10-day clock that exists nowhere in the child-abuse statute.

Source: California Penal Code §§11165.7, 11166 — mandated child-abuse reporting. §11165.7(a)(21) does not name "dental assistant." It names a dentist and a…